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THE CASE FOR A PERMANENT
INTERNATIONAL TRUTH COMMISSION
MICHAEL P. SCHARF*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the U.S. Chief Prosecutor
at Nuremberg, said that one of the most important legacies of the in-
ternational war crimes trials following World War II would be the
documentation of the Nazi atrocities “with such authenticity and in
such detail that there can be no responsible denial of these crimes in
the future and no tradition of martyrdom of the Nazi leaders can arise
among informed people.”1  Jackson said further that to establish an
authoritative record of abuses to endure the test of time and withstand
the challenge of revisionism, “we must establish incredible events by
credible evidence.”2
The international community has principally used two methods to
establish the record of grave human rights crimes following an interna-
tional conflict or civil war: international prosecutions such as those
conducted at Nuremberg and Tokyo following World War II, and more
recently at The Hague, Netherlands, and in Arusha, Tanzania, follow-
ing the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; and commis-
sions of inquiry, now commonly referred to as “truth commissions,”
which investigate situations and submit reports of their findings but
have no power to impose criminal fines or sentences.3
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1. Report to the President from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the
United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, Oct. 7, 1946 (on file with the Duke
Journal of Comparative & International Law).
2. Report to the President from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the
United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, June 7, 1945, reprinted in 39 AM. J.
INT’L L. 178, 184 (Supp. 1945).
3. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative
Study, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER
REGIMES 225, 225-26 (N. Kritz ed., 1995).
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While the United Nations has recognized the need for a perma-
nent international criminal court to supplant the current ad hoc ap-
proach,4 until now, no one has made a similar proposal for a permanent
truth commission.  Although there are some advantages to the flexibil-
ity that an ad hoc approach provides, the truth commissions that have
been established thus far have been plagued by a host of problems.
Most of the truth commissions have been woefully underfunded.  They
have also been vulnerable to politically imposed limitations and ma-
nipulation: Their structure, mandate, resources, access to information,
willingness or ability to take on sensitive cases, and strength of final re-
port have been largely determined by the political forces at play in
their creation.  In addition, most have lacked the power to impose
sanctions on perpetrators or provide compensation to victims, have not
provided those named as perpetrators with the basic rights available to
a criminal defendant, and have lacked the transparency necessary for a
credible proceeding.  These problems could be avoided by the creation
of a permanent institution.
This Article presents the case for the establishment of a perma-
nent international truth commission as an adjunct to a permanent in-
ternational criminal court or domestic prosecutions.  Such a commis-
sion would be available to countries in the aftermath of situations
involving grave humanitarian or human rights crimes.  From the expe-
rience of the several international and national truth commissions es-
tablished to date, this Article seeks to distill a framework for a pro-
posed permanent international truth commission which would avoid
the major problems that afflicted its predecessors.  A draft statute for a
permanent international truth commission is appended at the end of
the Article with the hope that it will serve as a launching point for fu-
ture consideration.
4. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Fifth Session,
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 258, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993) (proposing a Draft
Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal). See generally James Crawford, The ILC’s Draft
Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 140, 140-42 (1994).  In 1995,
the General Assembly voted to establish a preparatory committee to revise the International
Law Commission’s Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court and prepare a widely ac-
ceptable consolidated text for adoption at a conference of plenipotentiaries in 1997 or 1998.
Italy has offered to host the conference.  For a discussion of the debate leading to the adoption
of this resolution, see Virginia Morris & Christianne Bourloyannis-Vrailas, The Work of the
Sixth Committee at the Fiftieth Session of the UN General Assembly, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 491, 496
(1996).
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II.  THE NEED FOR A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL
TRUTH COMMISSION
A.  A Brief History of Truth Commissions
The first international truth commission in modern times was es-
tablished by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to inves-
tigate alleged atrocities committed against civilians and prisoners of
war during the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913.5  After World War I, the
Allies created the 1919 Commission on the Responsibility of the
Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, which investi-
gated German and Turkish atrocities committed during the war.6
During World War II, the Allies established the United Nations War
Crimes Commission to investigate German war crimes,7 and the Far
Eastern Commission to investigate Japanese war crimes.8  In 1978, the
parties to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 set
up an International Fact-Finding Commission to investigate serious
violations of the Geneva Conventions.9  During the 1990s, the interna-
tional community via the United Nations established truth commis-
sions for El Salvador,10 Guatemala,11 Somalia,12 the Former Yugosla-
5. See generally Report of the International Commission to Inquire Into the Causes and
Conduct of the Balkan Wars, reprinted in THE OTHER BALKAN WARS (Carnegie Endowment
for Int’l Peace, 1993).
6. See generally PAMPHLET NO. 32, DIVISION OF INT’L LAW, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT’L L. 95-154 (1920).
7. See U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 443-50 (1948).
8. See Summary Statement by the Secretary-General: Apprehension, Trial and Punishment
of War Criminals in the Far East, 16 DEP’T ST. BULL. 799, 804-06 (1947).
9. See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 90,
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1429-31 (1977) [hereinafter Ad-
ditional Protocol I].  The seldom-used International Fact-Finding Commission has had limited
utility since it is available only in international armed conflicts and only in situations in which
the combatant countries have declared their recognition of the competence of the commission.
See THE NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 342-44, 378-80 (Antonio Cassese
ed., 1979).
10. See generally Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador: From Madness to
Hope, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annexes, U.N. Doc. S/25500 (1993) [hereinafter El Salvador
Commission Report].
11. See Accord on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Human Rights Viola-
tions and Acts of Violence That Have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer, Signed in
Oslo, Norway 23 June 1994, U.N. Doc A/48/954-S/1994/1751, 1 July 1994, reprinted in 3
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES
220 (N. Kritz ed., 1995).  Under the Accord, the U.N. moderator for the peace negotiations
serves as one of three members of the Guatemala Truth Commission and will name the other
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via,13 and Rwanda.14  The United Nations is currently considering a
proposal to establish another such commission to document the abuses
of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.15  Moreover, in the past ten years, a
dozen states have set up their own domestic truth commissions to
document atrocities within their borders and facilitate national recon-
ciliation.16
In some cases, as in Argentina, the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, truth commissions have functioned as a first step toward, and
as a supplement to, national or international prosecutions.17  In others,
such as in El Salvador, Somalia, Haiti, Guatemala, and South Africa,
the truth commissions served as a substitute for prosecutions, and were
accompanied by de jure18 or de facto19 amnesties for the perpetrators.
                                                                                                                                     
two Guatemalan members with the agreement of the parties.  See Margaret Popkin & Naomi
Font-Arriaza, Truth as Justice: Investigatory Commissions in Latin America, 1 TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE , supra note 3, at 262, 267-68.
12. See generally Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel which
led to Casualties Among Them, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/653 (1994)
[hereinafter Somalia Commission Report].
13. See generally Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Secu-
rity Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994)
[hereinafter Yugoslavia Commission Report].
14. See generally Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Secu-
rity Council Resolution 935 (1994), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (1994)
[hereinafter Rwanda Commission Report].
15. See Leo Dobbs, U.N. Official Calls for Cambodian Truth Commission, Reuters News,
Feb. 6, 1997 (reporting call for a truth commission by U.N. Special Representative on Human
Rights for Cambodia).
16. See generally Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Com-
parative Study, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 225-61 (discussing the establish-
ment of truth commissions in Argentina, Bolivia, Chad, Chile, Germany, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Uganda, and Uruguay).
17. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993)
(establishing Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d
mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/955 (1994) (establishing Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal).  After the pub-
lication of the Argentinean Truth Commission’s report, the government of President Raul Al-
fonsin undertook to prosecute members of the military responsible for some 9,000 disappear-
ances of civilians.  However, when the military rebelled, Alfonsin’s successor as president,
Carlos Saul Menem, pardoned the junta leaders and called off the prosecutions.  See Tina Ro-
senberg, Overcoming the Legacies of Dictatorship, 74 FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1995, at 134,
146, 149.
18. A few days after the publication of the El Salvador Truth Commission’s report, the
government of El Salvador enacted an across-the-board amnesty for all individuals identified in
the report as responsible for serious acts of violence.  See Thomas Buergenthal, The United
Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 497, 537 (1994).
Pursuant to an agreement between the Aristide Government and the de facto military
leaders negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations, the Haitian parliament enacted an
amnesty for the members of the military regime who had committed widespread human rights
crimes.  At the same time, Haiti established a seven-member truth commission to investigate
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B.  The Function of a Truth Commission
Truth commissions serve four primary purposes: (1) to establish
an historic record; (2) to obtain justice for the victims; (3) to facilitate
national reconciliation; and (4) to deter further violations and abuses.
Creating a credible account of human rights crimes “prevents history
from being lost or rewritten, and allows a society to learn from its past
in order to prevent a repetition of such violence in the future.”20  Jus-
tice is promoted by imposing moral condemnation and laying the
groundwork for other sanctions.  National reconciliation and individual
rehabilitation are facilitated by acknowledging the suffering of victims
and their families, helping to resolve uncertain cases, and allowing vic-
tims to tell their story, thus serving a therapeutic purpose for an entire
country, and imparting to the citizenry a sense of dignity and empow-
erment that could help them move beyond the pain of the past.21  Fur-
ther violations are deterred with specific recommendations for re-
form,22 which can provide pressure points around which the civilian
society or the international community can lobby for change in the fu-
ture.23
                                                                                                                                     
and document the human rights crimes committed in Haiti during Aristide’s exile.  See Michael
P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty For Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes in
Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 17-18 (1996).
19. After the submission of the Somalia Commission report identifying warlord Mohamed
Farrah Aidid as responsible for the murder of 24 U.N. peacekeeping troops in 1993, the Secu-
rity Council passed a resolution authorizing Aidid’s “arrest, and detention for prosecution, trial
and punishment.”  S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3229th mtg. at 83, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/49 (1993).  Later, the Council rescinded this order in an effort “to foster political dia-
logue which can lead to national reconciliation.” Statement of Ambassador Albright, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3315th mtg. at 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3315 (1993); S.C. Res. 885, U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., 3315th mtg. at 86, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993).
20. Hayner, supra note 3, at 225-62.
21. Studies of torture victims suggest that “production of a written document systematizing
and summarizing their experiences was therapeutic because it helped the victims ‘integrate the
traumatic experience into their lives by identifying its significance in the context of political and
social events as well as the context of their personal history.’” NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA,
IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 19 (1995). In addi-
tion, psychologists have found that the process of producing testimony about the traumatic
events before an investigative body can channel victims’ anger into a socially constructive ac-
tion and provides a form of catharsis.  See id.
22. Past commission reports have included recommendations covering military and police
reform, as well as strengthening of democratic institutions, measures to promote national rec-
onciliation, or reform of the judicial system.  See, e.g., Chad: Report of the Commission of In-
quiry into the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed by Ex-President Habre, His Accom-
plices and/or Accessories, May 7, 1992, reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at
51, 92; Chile: Report of the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, February 9, 1991,
reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 105, 152-166; El Salvador Commission
Report, reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 177, 204-215.
23. See generally Hayner, supra note 3.
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In addition to these four primary purposes, truth commissions can
also serve other secondary functions related to criminal prosecutions.
Truth commissions can be an important precursor to judicial action,
working as an intermediate step for states not yet ready to endorse full-
scale prosecutions.  As the commissions for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda illustrate, the authoritative report of a commission can help
muster the political will necessary for taking the next step toward
bringing perpetrators to justice.24 The work of the truth commissions
also provided the basis for early indictments once the United Nations
had decided to opt for international prosecutions.25  Deterrence might
be established through effective, selective prosecutions to demonstrate
that abuses are subject to punishment and offenders subject to the rule
of law, but such prosecutions would focus only on individual liability
and thus fail to tell the whole story of abuses.  A truth commission can
supplement prosecutions by establishing a more complete historical re-
cord of abuses, victims, and perpetrators.  Such a record would be use-
ful especially where the sheer number of perpetrators, such as in
Rwanda where over 100,000 Hutus participated in the killing of a half
million Tutsis,26 would render individual prosecution alone an insuffi-
cient response.  And, by collecting and preserving evidence and testi-
mony, a truth commission can help ensure that in cases where it may be
necessary to defer prosecutions to promote an end to hostilities,27 jus-
tice is merely postponed, not sacrificed altogether.
C.  The Advantages of a Permanent International Institution
There are four advantages to establishing a permanent interna-
tional body rather than relying on ad hoc national truth commissions:
(1) superior sufficiency of funding; (2) a greater perception of neutral-
ity; (3) less susceptibility to domestic influences; and (4) greater speed
in launching investigations.  Each is discussed in turn below.
First, individual states recovering from an international conflict or
civil war normally lack the financial resources to carry out a compre-
24. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 17; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 17.
25. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the For-
mer Yugoslavia, OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 2 (International Human Rights Law Institute,
DePaul University College of Law, 1996), at 68.
26. See 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at xxi.
27. The experiences of Uruguay and Argentina suggest that aggressive efforts to prosecute
members of a former regime may induce attempts to overthrow the incipient democratic gov-
ernment.  See Dianne F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Former Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2545 (1991).
SCHARF FINAL MACRO 12/10/97  4:15 PM
1997] PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL TRUTH COMMISSION 381
hensive investigation.  The Bolivian and Philippine truth commissions
lacked sufficient resources to complete their work, the Chadian truth
commission was paralyzed for months by lack of funds, and the ongo-
ing Ugandan commission has had to halt its work on several occasions
due to a shortage of cash.28  An international truth commission, in con-
trast, is more likely to have stable and adequate funding.  For example,
El Salvador’s U.N.-sponsored commission enjoyed ample funding of
about $2.5 million,29 and the U.N.’s Commission for the Former Yugo-
slavia received $500,000 from the United Nations and an additional
$1.3 million in contributions from thirteen states and private founda-
tions.30
Second, an international truth commission can guarantee neutral-
ity in a highly polarized environment.  Many of the past national truth
commissions have been accused of partisanship, having commissioners
politically beholden to the current administration, or being unabash-
edly pro-government or regionally biased.31  To be perceived as fair, a
truth commission should establish its independence from all the actors
in a contested history.  It must have the moral authority to examine
and judge the acts and motivations of others.  A geographically diverse
international truth commission is much more likely to be perceived as
objective and disinterested than a national truth commission.32  Moreo-
ver, there would be a greater sense of legitimacy derived from the in-
ternational community’s involvement, as well as greater international
attention to the work of such an institution, thus increasing pressure for
the parties within the country to cooperate with the Commission’s
work and implement its recommendations.
Third, an international body would operate in a more secure envi-
ronment and have access to greater security measures, which would fa-
cilitate the smooth and safe operation of the commission.  The truth
commission for El Salvador, for example, included permanent U.N.
diplomatic security personnel assigned to protect the commissioners
and the office.33  The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
28. See Hayner, supra note 3, at 232-36.
29. See Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., International Truth Commissions and Justice, 5 ASPEN
INST. Q. 69, 89 (1993).
30. See Bassiouni, supra note 25, at 9 n.24.
31. See generally Hayner, supra note 3.
32. However, it is important that a commission retain staff who are familiar with the cul-
ture, history, and politics of the country under investigation.  Otherwise, the commission may
encounter difficulties in perceiving the relative importance of certain cases, as well as the con-
sequences of their decisions and recommendations.
33. See Hayner, supra note 3, at 250.
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provided protection to the on-site investigations and mass-grave exhu-
mations undertaken in Croatia and Bosnia by the commission of ex-
perts established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 780.34  Moreo-
ver, an international commission would be less likely to be influenced
by forces within the country and would be less susceptible to fear of re-
prisal.  Commissioners who are outsiders are more likely to ask hard
questions and push to get information in a way that would be difficult
for those closer to the conflict.
Fourth, the existence of a permanent body with a flexible man-
date would ensure a more rapid investigation.  A recurring problem of
past truth commissions has been the delay between their establishment
and the initiation of investigations.  It took over eighteen months for
the commission of experts established by U.N. Security Council Reso-
lution 780 to initiate investigative missions in the territory of the for-
mer Yugoslavia.35  Just as it is often said that justice delayed is justice
denied, so too can delays affect the efficacy of the search for truth.
With time, memories fade and evidence disappears.  The creation of a
permanent commission would avoid the time consuming process of ap-
pointing commissioners, approving a budget, drawing up internal rules,
and hiring a staff, thereby enabling the commission to proceed imme-
diately with its investigation.
D.  The Proposed Structure and Jurisdiction of a Permanent Truth
Commission
As envisaged in the appended Draft Statute, a permanent interna-
tional truth commission could be established in the same manner as a
permanent international criminal court—by a treaty open to all inter-
ested states.  No more than a small number of commissioners would be
necessary, provided the commission is equipped with adequate admin-
istrative staff for its workload, including lawyers, analysts, interpreters,
secretaries, security personnel, and investigators.36  To ensure geo-
graphic diversity, the commissioners would be elected by an absolute
majority vote of the state parties, with a caveat that no two commis-
sioners may be nationals of the same state.37  Moreover, provision
would be made for recusal or disqualification of commissioners in
34. See Yugoslavia Commission Report, supra note 13, paras. 36, 271-73.
35. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Coun-
cil Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994).
36. See Appendix, infra, art. 5.
37. See id. art. 6.
SCHARF FINAL MACRO 12/10/97  4:15 PM
1997] PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL TRUTH COMMISSION 383
situations in which their impartiality might be in doubt.38  To keep costs
down, between investigations commissioners and staff could be paid a
prorated salary “on an as when actually employed basis.”39
A precedent for this approach would be the International Fact-
Finding Commission created by Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.  That body has had limited utility because it is
only available in international armed conflicts and only in situations in
which the combatant countries have declared their recognition of its
competence.40  In contrast, the jurisdiction of the proposed permanent
truth commission would include the following:
(a) the crime of genocide;41
(b) serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in both in-
ternational and internal armed conflicts;42 and
(c) crimes against humanity,43 including enforced disappearances,44
extra-legal executions45 and acts of torture.46
38. See id. art. 9.
39. Id. art. 12.  The Rwanda Tribunal employed this cost-saving measure with respect to
its judges prior to the commencement of trials.  See Report of the Advisory Committee on Ad-
ministrative and Budgetary Questions, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 160, at 3, U.N.
Doc. A/50/923 (1996).
40. See Additional Protocol I, art. 90, supra note 9.
41. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
42. See generally Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Additional Protocol I, supra
note 9; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature
Dec. 12 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442.
43 To constitute crimes against humanity, the acts must be inhumane in character; wide-
spread or systematic; directed against a civilian population; and committed on national, politi-
cal, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.  See Scharf, supra note 18, at 32; M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 248-50 (1992).
44. See Declaration on the Protection of All Persons From Enforced Disappearances, G.A.
Res. 47/133, in UNITED NATIONS, PRESS RELEASE, RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTED
BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DURING THE FIRST PART OF ITS FORTY-SEVENTH SESSION, U.N.
Doc. GA/8470 (1992).
45. See Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary
and Summary Executions, annexed to UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL,
RESOLUTION 1989/65: EFFECTIVE PREVENTION AND INVESTIGATION OF EXTRA-LEGAL,
ARBITRARY AND SUMMARY EXECUTIONS (1989).
46. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
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The commission’s jurisdiction over such acts would be triggered by a
request from the U.N. Security Council or a majority of state parties to
the statute.47  In so doing, the requesting entity would designate the
dates and geographic location which are to be the subject of the com-
mission’s investigation.
To ensure a balanced treatment of parties involved in the investi-
gation, unlike some of the past truth commissions,48 the proposed
commission would investigate the acts of all sides to a conflict, includ-
ing both government-initiated or sponsored violations and acts com-
mitted by opponents of the ruling regime.  The commission could also
investigate the role of international actors (usually foreign govern-
ments), who may be involved in the funding, arming, training or other-
wise assisting those responsible for serious human rights crimes.
For each situation the commission would be given twelve months
to complete its investigation and submit a report.49  The expenses of the
commission would be borne by the parties to its statute, or, in any case
referred to the commission by the Security Council, by the United Na-
tions.50  In addition, the commission would be authorized to accept vol-
untary contributions from interested states, including funds, materials,
and personnel.51
III.  ADDRESSING THE DEFICIENCIES OF PAST TRUTH
COMMISSIONS
A.  Rights of the Accused
To create an authoritative history, a truth commission’s work must
be detailed enough to convince skeptics that the facts it finds are true,
while at the same time providing overall patterns and explanations to
shape historical accounts of the atrocities.  Creating such a history re-
quires naming persons responsible for human rights crimes when there
is compelling evidence of their culpability.  While public identification
                                                                                                                                     
or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1984)
(entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
47. In many cases, this request would be in response to the request of a new regime.
48. See Margaret Popkin & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth as Justice: Investigatory Commis-
sions in Latin America, 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 262, 273.
49. See Appendix, infra, art. 16.
50. See id. art. 12.
51. See id.
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is not a penalty per se, it can adversely effect the reputation, career and
political prospects of individuals.  For this reason, most of the truth
commissions to date have avoided naming names so as not to violate
the due process rights of such individuals.  As Jose Zalaquett, a Com-
missioner on the Chilean Truth Commission, explained:
To name culprits who had not defended themselves and were not
obliged to do so would have been the moral equivalent to convict-
ing someone without due process.  This would have been in contra-
diction with the spirit, if not the letter, of the rule of law and human
rights principles.52
The El Salvador commission of 1992 was the first truth commis-
sion to publicly identify persons responsible for violations.  It identified
some forty-odd officials, including the minister of defense and the
president of the supreme court.  In the introductory chapter to its re-
port, the El Salvador commission explained its rationale:
It could be argued that, since the Commission’s investigation meth-
odology does not meet the normal requirements of due process, the
report should not name the people whom the Commission consid-
ers to be implicated in specific acts of violence.  The Commission
believes that it had no alternative but to do so.
In the peace agreements, the Parties made it quite clear that it was
necessary that the “complete truth be made known,” and that was
why the Commission was established.  Now, the whole truth cannot
be told without naming names.  After all, the Commission was not
asked to write an academic report on El Salvador, it was asked to
describe exceptionally important acts of violence and to recom-
mend measures to prevent the repetition of such acts.  This task
cannot be performed in the abstract, suppressing informa-
tion . . . where there is reliable testimony available, especially when
the persons identified occupy senior positions and perform official
functions directly related to violations or the cover-up of violations.
Not to name names would be to reinforce the very impunity to
which the Parties instructed the Commission to put an end.53
While the El Salvador commission identified certain individuals as
culprits and recommended administrative sanctions, it did so without
52. 1 REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECON-
CILIATION xxxii (Philip E. Berryman trans., 1993).
53. El Salvador Commission Report, supra note 10, at 25.
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according those identified an opportunity to confront their accusers.54
A critic of such a one-sided process asked, “What is the quality of the
truth that is established?  Will one be forced to make negative com-
parisons between the Commission’s truth and judicial truth or histori-
cal truth?”55
When this issue arose with respect to the recently established
South Africa Truth Commission, the South African Supreme Court
ruled that the commission must provide persons “proper, reasonable
and time[ly] notice” of hearings if evidence detrimentally implicating
them is to be heard.56  Similarly, the statute of the Uganda Truth
Commission contains a provision which states that “any one who in the
opinion of the Commissioners is adversely affected by the evidence
given before the Commission shall be given an opportunity to be heard
and to cross-examine the person giving such evidence.”57  This provi-
sion of basic due process rights is a positive development, which should
be included in the statute of a permanent international truth commis-
sion.58  The credibility of truth commissions would be enhanced im-
measurably by following this example and allowing persons who are
implicated in their investigation to appear in person, or through a rep-
resentative, to present their side of the story and to confront their ac-
cusers.
54. See Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., International Truth Commissions and Justice, 5 ASPEN
INST. Q. 69, 69 (1993).  The U.S. Supreme Court has expressed the importance of the right of
the accused to confront the witnesses against him or her as follows:  “Face-to-face confronta-
tion generally serves to enhance the accuracy of fact-finding by reducing the risk that a witness
will wrongfully implicate an innocent person.”  Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990).
55. Anton Ferreira, South Africa’s Road to Healing Paved with Problems, REUTERS, Apr.
11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
56. South Africa Truth Commission Seeks Clarification of Accused Rights, AFRICA NEWS
SERV., May 28, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.  While this ruling was
later reversed, the South African Truth Commission nonetheless decided to adopt the recom-
mended procedure.  See Alexander Boraine, Alternatives and Adjuncts to Criminal Prosecu-
tions, Remarks at the Justice in Cataclysm Conference, Brussels, Belgium, July 20-21, 1996, at
5 (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
57. The Commissions of Inquiry Act, Legal Notice No. 5 (May 16, 1986) (Cap. 56), re-
printed in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 255-57.
58. See Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Ac-
tion to Combat Impunity, Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Violations of Human
Rights: Final Report Prepared by Mr. L. Joinet Pursuant to Subcommission Resolution 1995/35,
Commission on Human Rights, Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/18 (1996)
(recommending that “the person implicated shall have the opportunity to make a statement
setting out his or her version of the facts or, within the time prescribed by the instrument estab-
lishing the commission, to submit a document equivalent to a right of reply for inclusion in the
file.”).
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B.  Transparency
Most of the truth commissions have operated privately, only re-
leasing a final report to the public,59 out of concern that “public investi-
gations risk scaring away witnesses that otherwise might testify, or put-
ting in danger those that do.”60  However, such closed proceedings have
undermined the integrity of the process, for it is human nature that
people do not trust what they cannot see.  In this way, past truth com-
missions have been susceptible to the criticisms levied on the infamous
“Star Chamber” of seventeenth century England.61  As the U.S. Su-
preme Court observed in a related context, “[t]o work effectively, it is
important that society’s criminal process satisfy the appearance of jus-
tice, and the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing
people to observe it.”62
The South African Truth Commission has recognized the value of
conducting its work in a manner that allows public observation.  Ac-
cording to Dr. Alexander Boraine, the Vice Chairperson of the Com-
mission, “There is the enormous advantage of the nation participating
in the hearings and the work of the Commission from the very begin-
ning through radio, television and the print media and the right of any-
one to attend any of the hearings,” which, he concludes, provides a
“strong educative opportunity so that healing and reconciliation is not
confined to a small group but is available to all.”63  In a similar vein,
Richard Goldstone, the Chief Prosecutor of the Yugoslavia War
Crimes Tribunal, said that “people don’t relate to statistics, to generali-
zations.  People can only relate and feel when they hear somebody that
they can identify with telling what happened to them.  That’s why the
59. Prior to the South African Truth Commission, the only partial exception to this trend
was the Argentinean Truth Commission, which, upon completion of its work in private, pro-
duced a two-hour synopsis of the testimony taken by the commission shown on national televi-
sion.  See Hayner, supra note 3, at 232.
60. Id. at 254.
61. The Court of Star Chamber was controlled by the monarch and was so named because
its seat was in the royal palace of Westminster in a room with stars painted on the ceiling.  In
the seventeenth century, the court was used by sovereigns James I and Charles I to suppress
opposition to their authority.  The court met in secret and dealt out excessive and cruel pun-
ishment.  The Star Chamber was finally abolished in 1641.  For a history of the Star Chamber,
see G.R. ELTON, STAR CHAMBER STORIES (1958); JOHN A. GUY, THE CARDINAL’S COURT:
THE IMPACT OF THOMAS WOLSEY IN STAR CHAMBER (1977); WILLIAM HUDSON, A
TREATISE OF THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER (Francis Hargrave ed., 1986).
62. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980); see also Joint Anti-
fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(“[F]airness can rarely be obtained by secret one-sided determinations of facts decisive of
rights.”).
63. See Boraine, supra note 56, at 5.
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public broadcasts of the proceedings can have a strong healing and de-
terrent effect.”64
While there are complications and risks attendant to open pro-
ceedings,65 these can be addressed in less draconian ways than by com-
pletely closing the proceedings to the public and press.  For guidance in
this regard, one has only to turn to the recent experience of the Yugo-
slavia War Crimes Tribunal, which has developed an innovative pro-
ceeding similar to a “mini” truth commission, known as a Rule 61
hearing.  When the prosecution has been unable to secure the presence
of the accused for a full blown trial, the Rule 61 hearing allows the
prosecutor to present its case to the Tribunal in a public, televised pro-
ceeding.66  To protect rape victims and other witnesses from possible
danger, the Tribunal employs a variety of means such as expunging
names and identifying information from public records, giving of testi-
mony through image- and voice-altering devices or closed circuit tele-
vision, and assigning pseudonyms.67  The use of such protective meas-
ures would allow a truth commission both to protect witnesses and to
avail itself of the benefits of a public proceeding.
C.  Victim Compensation
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on
Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the
Torture Convention all recognize the right of victims of human rights
abuses to receive compensation for their injury.68  Compensable inju-
ries include loss of life, physical or psychological injury, loss of liberty,
loss of or damage to property, loss of opportunity, and other injuries
64. Interview with Richard Goldstone, Chief Prosecutor of the Yugoslavia War Crimes
Tribunal, in Brussels, Belgium (July 20, 1996) (on file with author).
65. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
66. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, Rule 61,
reprinted in 2 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 66 (1995).
67. See id. Rule 75.
68. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Addressing Gross Human Rights Abuses: Punishment and
Victim Compensation, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 425, 448-49
(Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994); Study Concerning the Right to Restitu-
tion, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Sub Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/10 (1990), reprinted in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3,
at 505, 515.
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proximately caused by the abuses.69  Compensation can either be
monetary or in the form of non-monetary reparation such as provision
of new employment, pension rights, medical and educational services,
social security, and housing.70  A truth commission can play an impor-
tant role in the provision of such compensation.
The most obvious method of obtaining victim compensation is for
the injured party, or their next of kin, to bring suit in the courts of the
state involved. However, victims of human rights abuses often do not
know the identity of those who perpetrated the abuses against them.
Even when the identity of the persecutors is known, the victims fre-
quently lack evidence of the persecutors’ participation, as there are
rarely written records of abuses and witnesses are generally reluctant
to come forward.  A truth commission could assist in the attainment of
compensation through the judicial process by transmitting to the com-
petent judicial authorities the commission’s findings that a victim has
suffered injury due to the acts of a specific individual or governmental
entity.  Yet, even with the findings of a truth commission, there are
likely to be other obstacles to obtaining victim compensation through
domestic courts: The individuals directly responsible frequently lack
sufficient resources for adequate compensation; amnesties often extin-
guish the possibility of civil compensation;71 and the limitations of na-
tional law often deprive victims of any cause of action.72
Some countries, such as the United States, have opened their
courts to foreign citizens wishing to bring suit for human rights abuses
committed in a foreign country.  The Alien Tort Claims Act provides
the U.S. courts with jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States,”73 and the recently enacted Torture Victim Protection
Act provides a private right of action against “an individual who, under
actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation,”
69. Ellen L. Lutz, After the Elections: Compensating Victims of Human Rights Abuses, in 1
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,  supra note 3, at 551, 559.
70. Theo van Boven et al., Seminar on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Reha-
bilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Sum-
mary and Conclusions, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 500.
71. The week after the El Salvador Truth Commission report was published, the El Salva-
dor legislature adopted an amnesty law that provided for the extinction of civil as well as crimi-
nal responsibility.  See Margaret Popkin & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth as Justice: Investigatory
Commissions in Latin America, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 262, 283.
72. See Orentlicher, supra note 68, at 458.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (West 1993).
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subjects another individual to “torture” or to “extrajudicial killing.”74
If hurdles such as Foreign Sovereign Immunity,75 the Act of State Doc-
trine,76 and the Political Question Doctrine77 can be overcome, a plain-
tiff armed with the findings of an international truth commission that
the defendant is responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries is likely to
achieve success on the merits.78  Unfortunately, such suits ordinarily
represent little more than symbolic justice, as few of the defendants
would have assets in the United States that could be attached in execu-
tion of the judgment.79
Another scheme for victim compensation would involve the pay-
ment of compensation by the government, rather than by the individ-
ual perpetrators.  When, as is usually the case, the offender is a gov-
ernment authority or a private person acting as the agent of a
government, it should be the duty of the state itself to redress the in-
jury.80  Under the broad international law principles of state responsi-
74. Id.
75. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602.(1994), a foreign
official or agent cannot be sued in the United States for tortious conduct abroad.  See Argen-
tine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433-39 (1989); Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1474 (1993).
76. Under the Act of State doctrine, a U.S. court will not question the validity of the offi-
cial acts of a foreign government done within its own country.  Compare Underhill v. Her-
nandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (holding that unlawful detention by a foreign military com-
mander was a nonreviewable act of state), with Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d
Cir. 1980) (holding that unauthorized torture by a state official, in violation of the law of the
foreign state, might not properly be characterized as an act of state), and Sharon v. Time, Inc.,
599 F. Supp. 538, 544-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that the alleged unauthorized approval of a
massacre by a general is not an act of state).
77. Under the political question doctrine, a U.S. court will not decide an issue where there
is:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate po-
litical department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).  Compare Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp.
1452, 1457 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that suit against Contras for the wrongful death of U.S.
citizen in Nicaragua presented a nonjusticiable political question), with Klinghoffer v. S.N.C.
Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that determining liability for a ter-
rorist act on a cruise ship in the Mediterranean Sea did not implicate the political question doc-
trine).
78. Cf. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 n.10 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that the defendant’s
acts are “being investigated by a United Nations Commission of Experts.”).
79. See Taking Tyrants to Court, AM. LAW., Oct. 1991, at 56.
80. See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Compensating Victims of the Crimes of War, 12 VA. J. INT’L
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bility, the state is also responsible for failing to prevent or respond
adequately to human rights violations in its territory committed by
purely private parties or agents of a foreign government.81  In accor-
dance with the “principle of the continuity of the State in international
law,” the duty of the state to pay compensation applies even to a new
government that has replaced the government responsible for the
abuses.82  Recognizing this principle, after World War II the Federal
Republic of Germany provided individual compensation amounting to
over $10 billion to over three million victims of Nazi persecution.83
More recently, Albania,84 Bulgaria,85 Czechoslovakia,86 and Russia87
have enacted laws providing compensation and other relief to the vic-
tims of political repression under their former totalitarian govern-
ments.
Unfortunately, very few other states have ever voluntarily agreed
to pay compensation to the victims of a prior regime.88  There is prece-
dent, however, for an outside entity to compel a government to pay vic-
tim compensation.  For example, the European Court of Human
Rights has ordered governments to pay compensation to victims of
                                                                                                                                     
L. 343, 344 (1972); Organization of American States, Inter-American Court of Human Rights:
Valasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Series C No. 4, reprinted in 3 TRAN-
SITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 586, 588.
81. See Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, Sub Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities, Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/10, July
26, 1990, reprinted in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 505, 518.
82. Organization of American States, Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Valasquez
Rodriguez Case, supra note 80, at 586, 590.  In the Valasquez Rodriguez case, the Inter-
American  Court of Human Rights held the new Honduran government responsible for com-
pensating the victims of human rights abuses perpetrated by the prior regime.  See id.
83. See Ferencz, supra note 80, at 353; Kurt Schwerin, German Compensation for Victims
of Nazi Persecution, 67 NW. U. L. REV. 479, 489-520 (1972).
84. Albania: Law on Former Victims of Persecution, Law No. 7748, July 29, 1993, re-
printed in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 661-66.
85. Bulgaria: Law on Political and Civil Rehabilitation of Oppressed Persons, June 15,
1991, reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 672-74.
86. Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation, February
21, 1991, reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 704-17.
87. Law on Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression, October 18, 1991, as
amended December 17, 1992, reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 797-805.
88. By way of direct contrast to the German experience, one might look to the Japanese
treatment of the so-called “comfort women.”  In August 1993, the Japanese government for-
mally acknowledged that during World War II the Imperial Army forced thousands of women,
most of whom were Korean, into sexual slavery.  Japan has not taken any steps to provide
compensation to these victims or their families.  See Orentlicher, supra note 68, at 458-59.
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violations in well over one hundred cases.89  A few of the established
domestic truth commissions have put pressure on the national govern-
ment to provide appropriate victim compensation.  For example, the
Chile Commission for Truth and Reconciliation recommended that the
government award victims various social benefits, such as health care
(both physical and psychological), and financial support for the educa-
tion of children of persons killed or missing.90  The El Salvador truth
commission concluded that “justice does not stop at punishment; it also
demands reparation.  The victims and, in most cases, their families, are
entitled to moral and material compensation.”91  Its report called for a
special fund to be established for this purpose, to be funded by the
government, and urged foreign governments to allocate one percent of
their aid to El Salvador to the fund as well.92
In recommending foreign contributions, the El Salvador commis-
sion recognized a limitation to the approach of direct government
compensation.  After an internal or international conflict, depleted na-
tional resources often render significant financial compensation by a
state responsible for massive violations an unlikely prospect.  Some-
times, the authorities of the prior regime have spirited away large por-
tions of the government’s assets to secret bank accounts abroad.93  Yet
neither of these would be an insurmountable problem if the Security
Council were to freeze the assets of the target county’s government or
of the members of the responsible regime.94  For example, on August 2,
1991, the Security Council established a compensation commission to
create a fund and oversee the payment of compensation for claims
against Iraq “for any direct loss, damage, including environmental
damage and the depletion of natural resources, or any injury to foreign
89. See id. at 454.
90. See id. at 457.  Thereafter, the Chilean Parliament enacted the Law Creating the Na-
tional Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation, Law No. 19, 123 (January 31, 1992), re-
printed in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 685-95, to implement the recommenda-
tions contained in the Chile Truth Commission Report.
91. El Salvador: Report of the Commission on Truth, reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 177, 213.
92. See id.
93. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (effort by
Philippine government to lay legal claim to millions of dollars worth of foreign assets and ac-
counts controlled by former President).
94. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/841
(1993) (freezing assets of the Haitian military regime and its principal supporters); S.C. Res.
820, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3200th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (1993) (freezing assets of Ser-
bia-Montenegro); S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2943d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/46
(1990) (freezing assets of Iraq).
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Governments’ nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful
invasion and occupation of Kuwait.”95
A victim compensation fund from frozen assets was contemplated
for the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal.  Although the statute of the
Tribunal does not give it the power to award victim compensation, a
clause was included in Security Council Resolution 827 (which ap-
proved the statute of the Tribunal), declaring that the creation of the
Tribunal was without prejudice to the future establishment of a victim
compensation program.96  However, the Security Council later unfroze
the assets of Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs,97 thereby ending any possi-
bility of such a program for the victims of ethnic cleansing in the Bal-
kans.
Considering these experiences, this Article proposes a three-tiered
compensation scheme for the permanent international truth commis-
sion.  In the first tier, the commission would transmit to the competent
authorities of the state(s) concerned its findings that a victim has suf-
fered injury because of the acts of a specific individual or governmental
entity.98  Pursuant to relevant national legislation, a victim or persons
claiming through him or her may bring an action in a national court or
other competent body to obtain compensation.99  The second tier
would involve the establishment of a victim’s compensation fund for
each situation under the commission’s jurisdiction.  Resources for the
fund would be supplied by the government of the state in whose terri-
tory the violations were committed and by foreign governments, who
would be urged to allocate a small percentage of their aid to that state
for the victim compensation fund.100  The third tier would be available
in cases in which the assets of the responsible authorities have been
frozen in accordance with a Security Council Resolution under Chap-
ter VII of the United Nations Charter.101  In those cases, states would
95. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
The Iraqi Compensation Commission has received over 2,335,000 claims submitted by 78 gov-
ernments on behalf of their citizens.  Letter Dated 17 January 1994 From the President of the
Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission Addressed to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/107 (1994); see also John R.
Crook, The United Nations Compensation Commission—A New Structure to Enforce State Re-
sponsibility?, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 144 (1993).
96. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
97. See S.C. Res. 1074, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3700th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/1074
(1995).
98. See Appendix, infra, art. 21, para. 2.
99. See id. art. 21, para. 3.
100. See id. art. 21, para. 2.
101. See supra note 94.
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be authorized to release such frozen assets to the victim compensation
fund.  The frozen assets could also be released pursuant to domestic
judicial awards for damages in favor of the victims of abuses against the
responsible authorities.102
D.  Imposition of Sanctions
While the very publicity of the truth about an individual’s respon-
sibility for human rights crimes exposes the perpetrator to public ig-
nominy and is therefore a form of punishment, the imposition of ad-
ministrative sanctions can have additional deterrent effects over both
the whole of society and the individual subject to the penalty.  Those
violators who hold political positions could be impeached or publicly
censured, and those with administrative authority, such as judges, civil
servants, soldiers, and police, could be removed, demoted, censured, or
lose their pension rights or other benefits.103  As has been recognized in
the context of the conflict in Bosnia, the barring of perpetrators of hu-
man rights crimes from holding influential public positions is an impor-
tant part of the transition from a repressive regime to democracy.104
The idea of barring perpetrators from office was the rationale be-
hind the recommendations of the El Salvador truth commission calling
for the dismissal from the armed forces of those active military officers
who had committed or covered up serious acts of violence.  The com-
mission also called for the dismissal of those civilian government offi-
cials and members of the judiciary who committed or covered up seri-
ous acts of violence or failed to investigate them, and recommended
that legislation be adopted barring all individuals found by the Com-
mission to have been implicated in serious acts of violence from hold-
ing any public office for at least ten years.105
It is critical that such sanctions not be implemented in a way that
imposes collective guilt by association.  The so-called lustration laws in
Germany and the Czech Republic106 have been criticized because they
102. See Appendix, infra, art. 21, para. 5.
103. See Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, supra note 58,
at 21-22.
104. See Letter Dated 29 November 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
A/50/790, S/1995/999 (1995), at 4 (General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina), 63 (Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina).
105. See Thomas Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador, 27
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 497, 536 (1994).
106. “Lustration is the disqualification and, where in office, the removal of certain catego-
ries of office-holders under the prior regime from certain private or public offices under the
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purge people based on party membership or official position without
evidence of any individual wrongdoing or responsibility for ordering,
perpetrating, or significantly aiding in perpetrating serious human
rights abuses.107  Procedural fairness and due process are especially im-
portant when collective guilt is imposed.  Such a determination should
be made on the basis of a more stringent standard, such as clear and
convincing evidence, rather than preponderance of the evidence, the
lesser standard used for awarding compensation.
Moreover, lustration and other non-criminal penalties are not pos-
sible unless the government in question has agreed in advance to im-
plement the sanctions recommended by a truth commission, as El Sal-
vador had done.108  By virtue of ratifying the treaty establishing the
permanent truth commission, parties would make such a pledge, and
nonparties could agree to cooperate with the truth commission on an
ad hoc basis.  Thus, in the context of a negotiated end to a civil or in-
ternational conflict, it is important that international mediators press
parties to agree to cooperate fully with a truth commission as part of
the settlement.  International verification of compliance with the ac-
cord should include an assessment of the degree to which the parties
have implemented the recommendations of the truth commission.  Fur-
ther, in a case referred to the permanent truth commission by the
United Nations Security Council, all states would be required to im-
plement the commission’s prescriptions by virtue of their obligation
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.109  In this way, international
pressure can substitute for political will in assuring that the recommen-
dations of a truth commission are fully carried out.
This does not mean, however, that there is no value to a truth
commission established in the absence of such a commitment from the
                                                                                                                                     
new regime.”  Herman Schwartz, Lustration in Eastern Europe, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
461, 461 (N. Kritz ed., 1995).
107. See id. at 464.
108. The parties to the El Salvador Peace Accords—the government and the FMLN—
agreed to be bound by the recommendations of the Truth commission.  See Thomas Buergen-
thal, The United Nations Truth Commission Truth Commission in El Salvador, 27 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 497, 533 (1994).  The commission called for the dismissal from the Armed
Forces of those active military officers who had committed serious acts of violence and dis-
missal from the government and judiciary of those persons who committed or cover up serious
acts of violence or failed to investigate them.  See id. at 536.
109. Article 2(6) and Article 25 of the U.N. Charter establish the respective obligations of
non-Member and Member States to comply with Security Council decisions made under Chap-
ter VII of the Charter.  The obligation to comply with the prescriptions of the truth commission
in a case referred to the commission by the Security Council would be analogous to the obliga-
tion of states to comply with the orders of the International Tribunals for the former Yugosla-
via and Rwanda.
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government in question or action by the Security Council.  Indeed, a
government’s response can range from active opposition to total sup-
port of the work of a truth commission, with most cases falling some-
where in between.  For example, a government might consent to allow
the truth commission to conduct interviews in-country, but refuse to
release government documents or provide other active assistance.  Un-
der such circumstances, the truth commission might still be able to es-
tablish a record of victims and perpetrators of abuses.  But pressure
from foreign governments and international organizations is needed to
obtain more ambitious results.
E.  The Granting of Amnesty
Truth commissions have all too frequently been viewed as an al-
ternative to prosecutions because many have been accompanied by
grants of amnesty to the major perpetrators of human rights crimes.
For example, the same day that the Haitian parliament established a
seven-member truth commission to investigate and document the hu-
man rights crimes committed in Haiti during Aristide’s exile, it enacted
an amnesty for the members of the military regime responsible for
these abuses.110  Following the publication of the El Salvador truth
commission’s report, El Salvador’s government enacted an amnesty
preventing the prosecution of those named in the report.111 Similarly,
the South African truth commission itself is empowered to grant am-
nesty as an inducement for the giving of testimony before the com-
mission.112
Viewing truth commissions as a substitute for prosecutions causes
two problems.  First, in some situations, the granting of amnesty may
be in violation of international legal instruments such as the 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions,113 the Genocide Convention,114 the Torture Conven-
110. See Scharf, supra note 18, at 18.
111. The week after the El Salvador truth commission report was published, the El Salva-
dor legislature adopted an amnesty law that provided for the extinction of civil as well as crimi-
nal responsibility.  See Margaret Popkin & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth as Justice: Investigatory
Commissions in Latin America, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 262, 283 (N. Kritz ed., 1995).
112. Victims’s Families Demand End to Amnesty for Human Rights Abusers, Agence
France-Presse, May 30, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.  The
South African scheme avoids some of the problems associated with a general amnesty by (1)
requiring that amnesty be applied for on an individual basis; (2) requiring applicants to make
full disclosure of their human rights violations in a public proceeding; and (3) providing am-
nesty only for acts associated with a political objective and not for personal gain or out of per-
sonal malice.  Remarks of Alexander Boraine, supra note 56.
113. Parties to the Geneva Conventions have an obligation to search for, prosecute, and
punish perpetrators of “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions unless they choose to hand
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tion,115 and, in the case of South Africa, the Apartheid Convention,116
which contain an absolute obligation to prosecute the crimes enumer-
ated therein.117  In addition, a blanket amnesty may violate general hu-
man rights conventions such as the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,118 the European Convention on Human Rights,119
and the American Convention on Human Rights,120 which obligate
states to “ensure” or “secure” the rights enumerated therein.121  As Ar-
ticle 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides, “a
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for failure to perform a treaty.”122  Second, even when amnesties do not
run afoul of these treaties,123 the creation of impunity through an am-
                                                                                                                                     
over such persons for trial by another state party.  See The Geneva Convention For the Ame-
lioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12,
1949, art. 51, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3148, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 64; The Geneva Convention for the Amelio-
ration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces
at Sea, August 12, 1949, art. 52, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 116; The Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, art. 131, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
3420, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 238; The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, art. 148, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 388.
114. Article 4 of the Genocide Convention states: “Persons committing genocide or any of
the acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsi-
ble rulers, public officials or private individuals.”  Article 5 requires states to “provide effective
penalties” for persons guilty of genocide.  Genocide Convention, supra note 41, at 280.
115. The Torture Convention requires each state party to ensure that all acts of torture are
offenses under its internal law, establish its jurisdiction over such offenses in cases where the
alleged offender is a national of the state, and if such a state does not extradite the alleged of-
fender, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.  See Torture
Convention, supra note 46.
116. The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, which entered into force in July 1978 and to which 99 states were party on Decem-
ber 31, 1993, obligates states party to prosecute the crime defined therein.  See Carla Edelen-
bos, Human Rights Violations: A Duty to Prosecute?, 7 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 5, 7 (1994).  Al-
though South Africa is not a party, Nelson Mandela’s African National Conference was one of
the driving forces behind the creation of the Apartheid Convention and it is therefore morally,
if not legally, committed to honor its mandate.
117. See Scharf, supra note 18, at 1-42.
118. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
119. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, signed Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
120. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673.
121. See Scharf, supra note 18, at 25-28.
122. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27,
reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 55 (1995).
123. For example, the obligation to prosecute under the Geneva Conventions applies only
to acts committed in international armed conflict, not to acts committed in a civil war.  The ob-
ligation to prosecute the crime of genocide applies only to persecution of ethnic, national, ra-
cial, or religious groups, not to acts directed against political opponents.  See supra notes 113,
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nesty can have the effect of encouraging future violations of the law.
The granting of such impunity erodes the rule of law by blurring the
norms of right and wrong and encourages the victims to resort to vigi-
lante justice; and, most worrisome of all, an amnesty that has the im-
primatur of the international community encourages a repetition of
similar abuses by perpetrators throughout the world.
While the deterrent value of prosecutions of international crimes
may be subject to debate,124 the granting of amnesty has been shown
empirically to foment future abuses.  For example, history records that
the international amnesty given to the Turkish officials responsible for
the massacre of over one million Armenians during World War I en-
couraged Adolf Hitler some twenty years later to conclude that Ger-
many could pursue his genocidal policies with impunity.125  Similarly,
the U.N. Human Rights Commission has concluded that the granting
of amnesties is one of the main reasons for the continuation of grave
violations of human rights throughout the world.126  Recent fact-finding
reports from Chile and El Salvador lend support to this conclusion.127
The evidence strongly suggests that the failure of the international
community to prosecute Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Saddam Hussein, and Mo-
hammed Aidid, among others, encouraged the Serbs to launch their
policy of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia with the expecta-
tion that they would not be held accountable for their international
crimes.128
                                                                                                                                     
114.
124. Those who commit crimes under emotional stress (such as murder in the heat of an-
ger) or who have become expert criminals (such as professional safebreakers and pickpockets)
are less likely than others to be deterred by the threat of criminal punishment.  See J.
ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 45-46 (1974).  Grant Niemann, one of the prose-
cutors of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, told this author in an interview, “deterrence has
a better chance of working with these kinds of crimes [war crimes, genocide, crimes against
humanity] than it does with ordinary domestic crimes because the people who commit these
acts are not hardened criminals; they’re politicians or leaders of the community that have up
until now been law abiding people.”  Interview with Grant Niemann, Prosecutor, International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in The Hague, Netherlands (July 25, 1996) (on
file with author).
125. Indeed, in a speech to his Commanding Generals, Hitler dismissed concerns about ac-
countability for acts of aggression and genocide by stating, “Who after all is today speaking
about the destruction of the Armenians?”  Adolf Hitler, Speech to Chief Commanders and
Commanding Generals, Aug. 22, 1939, quoted in BASSIOUNI, supra note 43, at 176 n.96.
126. See United Nations Commission on Human Rights: Report on the Consequences of Im-
punity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/13, reprinted in 3 TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at
19.
127. See Scharf, supra note 18, at 12 n.81.
128. Interview with Richard Goldstone, Chief Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, in Brussels, Belgium (July 20, 1996) (on file with author).
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Rather than condoning or endorsing such amnesties as a short-
term solution to international or internal conflicts, a more appropriate
response would parallel official U.S. policy with respect to terrorism,
which prohibits the government from “making concessions of any kind
to terrorists” on the ground that “such actions would only lead to more
terrorism.”129  Thus, the preamble of the proposed statute for a perma-
nent international truth commission emphasizes that the commission is
intended to be complementary to national and international prosecu-
tions, not a substitute for them.130
This is not to suggest that a country should rush ahead with prose-
cutions at the cost of political instability and social upheaval or that
every single perpetrator must be brought to justice—an admittedly im-
possible task in most countries that have experienced widespread hu-
man rights abuses.131  By documenting abuses and preserving evidence,
a truth commission can enable a country to delay prosecutions until the
international community has acted, or the new government is secure
enough to take such action against members of the former regime.132
129. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1988 at iii (1989).  It is
sometimes argued that leaders responsible for grave human rights crimes are “madmen,” in-
fected by ethnic-nationalism and xenophobia, and as such, are unlikely to be deterred by the
threat of criminal sanctions.  There seems to be a close parallel between such individuals and
terrorists, who are often willing to die for their cause.  And yet, based on the advice of leading
experts in the fields of psychology, sociology, and psychiatry, the United States Government
has concluded that the best way to deal with terrorists is to subject them to criminal prosecu-
tion.  As Attorney-Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence and Counsel to the Counter-
Terrorism Bureau at the U.S. Department of State, this author participated in the formulation
of this policy.
130. See Appendix, infra, pmbl.
131. In Rwanda, for example, it is estimated that hundreds of thousands of Rwandans par-
ticipated in the genocide of the Tutsis in 1994.  See Gerald Gahima, Rwanda: The Challenge of
Justice in the Aftermath of Genocide, (unpublished paper) (on file with author). For a discussion
of the atrocities that took place in Rwanda, see Madeline Morris, Trials of Concurrent Jurisdic-
tion: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 349 (1997). 
132. In the case of Rwanda, prior to the decision to establish an international criminal tri-
bunal, “a special investigations unit [under the auspices of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights] was established to gather evidence that might otherwise have been lost or de-
stroyed, to be turned over to the Prosecutor, if and when an international criminal court was
brought into existence.”  Report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Ac-
tivities of the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda, U.N. Doc. W/CN.4/1996/111, April 2,
1996, at para. 15.  This investigative body, similar to a truth commission, took pains to ensure
that the evidence it gathered could be used at trial.  According to the Report of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, this investigatory unit
carried out special investigations into acts of genocide, including a comprehensive
survey by forensic experts of massacre and mass grave sites, interviews of surviving
victims and witnesses and collection and preservation of documentary and other tan-
gible evidence . . . .  While this work did not involve investigations for the direct pur-
pose of prosecutions, it nevertheless required the highest standards of confidentiality
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International law recognizes the legitimacy of prosecutorial discretion,
both in terms of the selection of defendants and the timing of prosecu-
tions, so long as the selection criteria are not arbitrary.133  Through
eventual “exemplary” prosecutions, especially of the most culpable
perpetrators and the leaders responsible for planning or supervising
their abuses, together with the publication of a comprehensive truth
commission report, authorities can educate the population about what
the law is, deter future violations, and ensure a sense of justice for the
victims.
IV.  CONCLUSION
After an international conflict or civil war in which grave human
rights abuses have been committed, the truth must be told before there
can be a successful reconciliation.  Unfortunately, past truth commis-
sions, with their secret and one-sided deliberations, have not been able
to produce as authoritative a record as can be generated in a public
trial.  Criminal prosecutions, however, which by their nature focus on
individual liability, also fail to tell the whole story of abuses.  The es-
tablishment of a permanent truth commission employing fair and open
procedures would be able to create the authoritative and comprehen-
sive account of atrocities which is a necessary prerequisite for the
healing process to begin.
The establishment of a permanent international truth commission
would have many advantages over the current ad hoc approach.  By
virtue of its international structure, it would be seen as more impartial
and independent than nationally created commissions.  As a perma-
nent commission it would have greater resources, and could move
much more rapidly than its temporary counterparts.  Moreover, be-
cause of the continuing involvement of the international community,
there would be a greater likelihood that its recommendations would be
given serious consideration by national authorities.
Truth commissions are most useful when they are an adjunct or a
precursor to, rather than a substitute for, prosecutions.  To that end, a
                                                                                                                                     
and integrity of evidence-gathering because of its potential probative value before a
court of law.
Id. at para. 16.
133. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 408-09 (noting that
appropriate selection criteria might, for example, reflect distinctions based upon degrees of
culpability); see also Press Statement by Justice Richard Goldstone, Chief Prosecutor, Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in Conjunction with the Announcement of
Indictments (July 25, 1995) (describing strategy of targeting top leaders for prosecution).
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truth commission must be careful not to interfere with on-going do-
mestic or international criminal investigations or prosecutions.  In this
regard, Cherif Bassiouni, former Chairman of the Yugoslavia War
Crimes Commission, has suggested that “instead of creating an institu-
tion separate from a permanent international criminal court, why not
establish a truth commission as an agency of the Court?”134  After the
Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal had been established, Bassiouni had
similarly proposed that the Commission be “folded into the Tribu-
nal.”135
While the Yugoslavia War Crimes Commission was terminated
when the Tribunal’s Office of Prosecutor was established,136 there is
precedent for imbuing a prosecutor with the additional functions of a
truth commission.  Consider, for example, the statutory mandate given
to Lawrence Walsh, Independent Prosecutor for the Iran/Contra inves-
tigation.137  Walsh was responsible for the investigation of the conspir-
acy among high-ranking Reagan Administration officials to divert the
proceeds from the sale of U.S. arms to Iran to the Nicaragua Contras in
violation of U.S. law.  His three volume, 2,500 page report provided a
comprehensive “account of the Independent Counsel’s investigation,
the prosecutions, the basis for decisions not to prosecute, and overall
observations and conclusions on the Iran/contra matters.”138  Similarly,
the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Ethiopia established in 1992
was given the mandate to create a publicly available computerized
“historical record of the documentable abuses of the Mengistu regime”
in addition to prosecuting individual cases.139  Although the statute ap-
pended to this Article envisages a stand-alone commission, its provi-
sions for jurisdiction, functions and powers, victim compensation, and
134. Interview with M. Cherif Bassiouni, former Chairman of the Yugoslavia War Crimes
Commission, in Brussels, Belgium (July 19, 1996) (on file with author).
135. Iain Guest, On Trial: The United Nations, War Crimes, and the Former Yugoslavia 90
(Sept. 1995) (unpublished report of the Refugee Policy Group) (on file with author).
136. See id.
137. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 595(b)(2), 92 Stat. 1824
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 595(a)(2) (1994)) “establishes a stand-by mechanism for the appoint-
ment of a temporary special prosecutor when needed.”  S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 1 (1978). Its
purpose is “to preserve and promote the accountability and integrity of public officials and of
the institutions of the Federal Government and to invigorate the Constitutional separation of
powers between the three branches of Government.”  See id.
138. LAWRENCE E. WALSH, 1 FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR
IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS xvi (United States Ct. of App. for the Dist. of Columbia Cir., Aug. 4,
1993).
139. See Ethiopia: Report of the Office of Special Prosecutor, reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 559, 574.
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penalties could easily be adapted and incorporated into the statute for
a permanent international criminal court or of an ad hoc tribunal.
Unfortunately, we are likely in the years ahead to see many more
civil wars and international conflicts marked by grave human rights
abuses.140  To paraphrase George Santayana, history’s mistakes are
bound to be repeated unless the international community can ensure
through the development of a credible record that States learn the les-
sons of the past.141  The creation of a permanent international criminal
court and a permanent truth commission could be the twin pillars of
establishing such a record that can endure the test of time and the
challenge of revisionism.
140. See generally DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, PANDAEMONIUM: ETHNICITY IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1993).
141. See GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN
PROGRESS 316 (1953).
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APPENDIX
DRAFT STATUTE FOR A PERMANENT
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
The States parties to this Statute,
Recognizing the need in the aftermath of international and inter-
nal conflicts for an impartial, fair, and authoritative record of grave
human rights crimes and serious violations of international humani-
tarian law;
Desiring to establish a permanent international mechanism for
achieving such a record as situations arise;
Emphasizing that such a mechanism is intended to be complemen-
tary to national and international prosecutions, not a substitute for
them;
Have agreed as follows:
PART 1.  ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY
Article 1
The Commission
There is established an International Commission of Inquiry (“the
Commission”), whose jurisdiction and functioning shall be governed by
the provisions of this Statute.
Article 2
Relationship of the Commission to the United Nations
The Chairperson of the Commission, with the approval of the
States parties to this Statute, may conclude an agreement establishing
an appropriate relationship between the Commission and the United
Nations.
Article 3
Seat of the Commission
1.The seat of the Commission shall be established at _______.
2.The Chairperson, with the approval of the States parties to this
Statute, may conclude an agreement with the host State establishing
the relationship between that State and the Commission.
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3.The Commission may exercise its powers and functions on the
territory of any State party and, by special agreement, on the territory
of any other State.
Article 4
Status and Legal Capacity
1.The Commission is a permanent institution open to States par-
ties to this Statute in accordance with this Statute.  It shall act when re-
quired to consider a case submitted to it.
2.The Commission shall enjoy in the territory of each State party
such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions
and the fulfillment of its purposes.
PART 2.  COMPOSITION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE
COMMISSION
Article 5
Composition of the Commission
1.The Commission shall consist of five members, including a
Chairperson and a Vice Chairperson as provided in article 8.
2.The States parties to this Statute may temporarily or perma-
nently increase the number of Commissioners by two-thirds vote if
warranted by the Commission’s workload.
3.The Commission shall appoint an administrative staff commen-
surate with its workload, including lawyers, analysts, interpreters, sec-
retaries, security personnel, and investigators.
Article 6
Election of Commissioners
1.Each State party may nominate for election not more than two
persons, of different nationality, who are willing to serve as may be re-
quired on the Commission.
2.The Commissioners shall be elected by an absolute majority
vote of the States parties by secret ballot.
3.No two Commissioners may be nationals of the same State.
4.Commissioners hold office for a term of five years and, subject
to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Article, are not eligible for re-election.  A
Commissioner shall, however, continue in office in order to complete
the investigation of any situation which has commenced before the ex-
piration of his/her term.
5.At the first election, one Commissioner chosen by lot shall serve
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for a term of one year and be eligible for re-election; two Commission-
ers chosen by lot shall serve for a term of three years and are eligible
for re-election; and the remainder shall serve for a term of five years.
6.In the event of a vacancy, a replacement Commissioner shall be
elected in accordance with article 6 to fill the remainder of the prede-
cessor’s term, and shall be eligible for re-election.
Article 7
Officers of the Commission
1.The Chairperson and the Vice-Chairperson shall be elected by
an absolute majority of the Commissioners.  They shall hold office until
the end of their terms as Commissioners.
2.The Vice-Chairperson may act in place of the Chairperson as
appropriate.
3.The Chairperson shall be responsible for:
(a)preparing the Commission’s annual budget and supplemental
budgets for the investigation of each situation referred to it, to be
approved by the States parties to this Statute or the United Nations
in accordance with article 12 of the Statute;
(b)hiring and firing of the Commission’s staff;
(c)the due administration of the Commission; and
(d)the other functions conferred on it by this Statute.
Article 8
Independence of the Commissioners
1.In performing their functions, the Commissioners shall be inde-
pendent.
2.Commissioners shall not engage in any activity or hold any offi-
cial position which is likely to interfere with their functions as a Com-
missioner or to affect confidence in their independence.
3.Any question as to the application of paragraph 2 shall be de-
cided by the Chairperson, or by the Vice-Chairperson if it concerns the
Chairperson.
Article 9
Excusing and Disqualification of Commissioners
1.For good cause, the Chairperson at the request of a Commis-
sioner may excuse that Commissioner from participating in a particular
investigation undertaken by the Commission.
2.Commissioners may not participate in the investigation of any
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situation in which they have previously been involved in any capacity
or in which their impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any
ground, including an actual, apparent, or potential conflict of interest.
3.Any question as to the disqualification of a Commissioner shall
be decided by an absolute majority of the members of the Commission.
Article 10
Loss of Office
1.A Commissioner who is found to have committed misconduct or
a serious breach of this Statute, or to be unable to exercise the func-
tions required by this Statute because of long-term illness or disability,
shall cease to hold office.
2.A decision as to the loss of office under paragraph 1 shall be
made by secret ballot by a majority of the Commissioners.
Article 11
Privileges and Immunities
1.The Commissioners and the staff of the Commission shall enjoy
the privileges, immunities and facilities of a diplomatic agent within the
meaning of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 16
April 1961.
2.Counsel, experts and witnesses called before the Commission
shall enjoy the privileges and immunities necessary to the independent
exercise of their duties.
Article 12
Allowances and Expenses
1.The members of the Commission and its staff shall be paid a sal-
ary on an as when actually employed basis in accordance with the
schedule annexed to this Statute.  [The schedule is not included in this
Appendix.]
2.The salaries of the Commissioners and their staff and other ex-
penses of the Commission shall be borne by the parties to this Statute
in accordance with the annexed schedule or, in any case referred to the
Commission by the Security Council, by the United Nations.
3.The Commission is authorized to accept voluntary contributions
from interested States, including funds, materials, and personnel.
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Article 13
Working Languages
The working languages of the Commission shall be English and
the language of the State which is the subject of an investigation.
Article 14
Rules of the Commission
1.The Commission may by an absolute majority make rules for the
functioning of the Commission, the conduct of investigations, and any
other matter which is necessary for the implementation of this Statute.
2.The initial Rules of the Commission shall be drafted by the
Commissioners within six months of the first elections for the Commis-
sion, and be submitted to a conference of States parties for approval.
Subsequently, additional Rules or amendments to the Rules shall be
transmitted to States parties to this Statute and are considered to be
approved unless, within six months after transmission, a majority of the
States parties have communicated in writing their objections.  A pro-
posed rule will apply provisionally pending the expiration of the six-
month period.
PART 3.  JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION
Article 15
Situations Within the Jurisdiction of the Commission
The Commission has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute
with respect to situations involving the following international crimes:
(a)the crime of genocide;
(b)serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in interna-
tional and internal armed conflict; and
(c)crimes against humanity, including enforced disappearances, ex-
tra-legal executions and acts of torture.
Article 16
Preconditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction
1.The Commission shall exercise its jurisdiction over a situation
with respect to a crime mentioned in article 15 if the situation is re-
ferred to it by the United Nations Security Council, or a majority vote
of States parties to this Statute.
2.In referring a situation, the relevant entity shall designate the
dates and geographic location which are to be the subject of the inves-
tigation.
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PART 4.  FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE COMMISSION
Article 17
Functions
1.The Commission shall have the task of undertaking investiga-
tions, making determinations, and issuing recommendations, with re-
spect to situations within its jurisdiction in accordance with articles 15
and 16.
2.The Commission’s proceedings shall be held in public and open
to the media, except as required for the protection of victims and wit-
nesses or confidential information.
3.The Commission shall present its findings and recommendations
in a final report in English and the official language of the country in
question, which shall:
(a)be submitted within one year of the conferral of jurisdiction over
a situation, unless extraordinary circumstances make a longer pe-
riod necessary;
(b)be adopted unanimously if possible, otherwise by a majority of
its Members;
(c)include an analysis of the nature and extent of violations, how
they were planned and executed, the fate of individual victims, and
on the basis of clear and convincing evidence the names of persons
primarily responsible for violations;
(d)include recommendations as to individual victim compensation;
(e)include recommendations as to appropriate non-criminal penal-
ties for perpetrators including partial or complete forfeiture of gov-
ernment pensions and temporary or permanent bans from military
or public office;
(f)include recommendations as to steps that will help avoid a repeat
of such atrocities in the future; and
(g)be transmitted to the authorities in the relevant State, the media,
as well as to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall
take steps to ensure its widespread public dissemination.
4.The Commission may, at its discretion, bring individual cases to
the attention of relevant national or international judicial authorities.
5.The Commission will endeavor to conduct its investigations so as
not to interfere with ongoing domestic or international criminal inves-
tigations and/or prosecutions.
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Article 18
Powers
For the purposes of the investigation, the Commission shall have
the power to:
(a)gather, by the means it deems appropriate, any information or
evidence it considers relevant to its mandate.
(b)interview any individuals, groups or members of organizations
or institutions.
(c)hear testimony of victims, witnesses, and other relevant parties.
(d)employ measures for the protection of victims and witnesses, in-
cluding such means as
(i)expunging names and identifying information from the
Commission’s Report;
(ii)giving of testimony through image- and voice-altering de-
vices or closed circuit television; and
(iii)assignment of a pseudonym; and
(e)carry out any other measures or inquiries which it considers use-
ful to the performance of its mandate, including requesting reports,
records, and documents from the relevant State authorities or
making on-site inspections.
Article 19
Rights of Persons Adversely Affected
A person who in the opinion of the Commission is likely to be ad-
versely affected by the evidence given before the Commission shall re-
ceive an opportunity to be heard in person or through a representative
and to cross-examine the person giving such evidence.
PART 5.  OBLIGATIONS OF STATES
Article 20
Cooperation
1.The States parties undertake to extend the Commission what-
ever cooperation it requests of them in order to gain access to sources
of information available to them.
2.In any case referred to the Commission by the United Nations
Security Council, all States are obligated to extend the Commission
whatever cooperation it requests of them in order to gain access to
sources of information available to them.
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Article 21
Victim Compensation
1.The victims of the human rights abuses within the jurisdiction of
the Commission are entitled to compensation for loss of life, physical
or psychological injury, loss of liberty, loss or damage to property, loss
of opportunity, and other injuries proximately caused by the abuses.
2.The Commission shall transmit to the competent authorities of
the State(s) concerned its findings that a victim has suffered injury due
to the acts of a specific individual or governmental entity.
3.Pursuant to the relevant national legislation, a victim or persons
claiming through him may bring an action in a national court or other
competent body to obtain compensation.
4.A fund shall be established for the compensation of victims,
which will be given resources by the government of the State involved
in the violations and by foreign governments, who are urged to allocate
_____ percent of their aid to that State for the victim compensation
fund.
5.When the assets of responsible authorities have been frozen in
accordance with a Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter, States may release such frozen assets to
the victim compensation fund.  Such frozen assets may also be released
pursuant to judicial awards for damages in favor of the victims of
abuses against the responsible authorities.
Article 22
Penalties
1.The State parties undertake to carry out the Commission’s rec-
ommendations for non-criminal penalties of persons found responsible
for violations of the crimes within the Commission’s jurisdiction.
2.In any case referred to the Commission by the United Nations
Security Council, all States are obligated to carry out the Commission’s
recommendations for non-criminal penalties of persons found respon-
sible for violations of the crimes within the Commission’s jurisdiction.
